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Abstract
The paper reviews origins of the approach to pricing derivatives post-crisis by following three
papers that have received wide acceptance from practitioners as the theoretical foundations for
it - [Piterbarg 2010], [Burgard and Kjaer 2010] and [Burgard and Kjaer 2013].
The review reveals several conceptual and technical inconsistencies with the approaches taken
in these papers. In particular, a key component of the approach - prescription of cost components
to a risk-free money account, generates derivative prices that are not cleared by the markets that
trade the derivative and its underlying securities. It also introduces several risk-free positions
(accounts) that accrue at persistently non-zero spreads with respect to each other and the risk-
free rate. In the case of derivatives with counterparty default risk [Burgard and Kjaer 2013]
introduces an approach referred to as semi-replication, which through the choice of cost compo-
nents in the money account results in derivative prices that carry arbitrage opportunities in the
form of holding portfolio of counterparty’s bonds versus a derivative position with it.
This paper derives no-arbitrage expressions for default-risky derivative contracts with and
without collateral, avoiding these inconsistencies.
∗Contact email: htumasyan@finrisksolutions.ca
†The author would like to thank John Hull, Alan White, Andrew Green and Darrell Duffie for stimulating discus-
sions at different stages of this work. The paper represents personal views of the author and does not constitute an
advice.
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1 Introduction
Derivative transactions today come with an attached collateral account and recognition for the
inherent counterparty default risk. The post-crisis paradigm for derivatives pricing dictates that
collateralized with cash trades should be discounted using the rate payable on the cash collateral,
while a bank’s own cost of funding should be used for discounting non-collateralized trades.
Despite the seemingly bifurcated approach to discounting, the two follow a single principle - in both
cases the discounting rate is a funding cost rate for the dealer bank (just different funding needs).
Moreover, discounting derivatives with the funding cost has been the case for a long time and before
the crisis (so the post-crisis paradigm is not really new). For many years (indeed decades) Libor
was considered to be the cost at which dealer banks would fund themselves unsecured. Over the
years, using this unsecured funding rate as the rate that was plugged in for the risk-free rate in
the no-arbitrage pricing formulas for derivatives has given Libor the title of a risk-free rate. This,
of course, was more of a misnomer and belief than an economic reality1. Nevertheless, as a result
of discounting with this single funding cost, dealers would land on the same price, giving the im-
pression that derivatives were priced according to a no-arbitrage pricing approach which upheld
the law of one price, and that trades are discounted with a risk-free rate. By implication then one
would be forced to state that the inter-dealer trades were happening in a complete and transparent
1This misnomer is in fact so prevalent, that the industry and regulatory initiatives for replacing Libor is referred
to sometimes as a search for an ”alternative risk-free rate”.
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no-arbitrage market.
Libor, however, was still a cost of unsecured funding for the dealer banks, although it was more of a
consensus rate set by the Libor panel of dealers, than a benchmark of market traded securities/rates.
This consensus single rate implied that all dealer banks have the same credit quality and cost of
funding, were they to fund themselves in capital markets.
The crisis, of course, forced fundamental principles of finance back into practice, whereby the funding
cost of each dealer is specific to its balance sheet structure (mix of assets and the capital structure)
and quality (earning power of assets). This and the lack of a market mechanism in the inter-dealer
market that would guarantee a counterparty on either end of a trade meant that transactions in
this market are now akin to lending or borrowing and carry default risk and associated costs.
Although arguments around the inclusion of these costs into derivatives pricing are still ongoing
(see for example [Cameron 2013, 2014] and [Hull and White 2012,2016]), and a fundamental ap-
proach (or an approach from fundamentals) is still missing, the pricing approach in [Piterbarg 2010],
[Burgard and Kjaer 2010] and [Burgard and Kjaer 2013] have become an accepted point of view by
major derivatives dealers.
We examine origins of this approach by following the three papers. In Section 2 we examine the
treatment of the money account in a general setting. We conclude that no-arbitrage pricing neither
provides foundations for, nor supports the structures assigned to the money account, and that in
general each structural component of the money account should be a risk-free account accruing at
a risk-free rate not to contradict the conditions for no-arbitrage. Section 3 demonstrates that the
observations on money accounts apply to the case of default-risky derivatives and, by doing so,
derives pricing partial differential equations for default-risky derivatives similar to that of a default-
risky bond starting with the setup in [Burgard and Kjaer 2013]. As expected, the bilateral nature
of default for derivatives and the derivatives-specific recovery rates emerge as the only difference
between pricing a default-risky bond and a default-risky derivative. Section 4 elaborates on these
two features and argues that for derivatives to go pari passu with unsecured senior bonds, deriva-
tives have to be priced as fully or partially unsecured liabilities, as opposed to fully collateralized
trades. Section 4 also argues that the collateral account cannot be part of the dynamic variables in
the replication portfolio or part of the money account with a non-risk-free rate of accrual. Instead,
Section 4 introduces collateral as part of an exogenous recovery process, treating it through the col-
lateralization level as a parameter in the valuation formulas for a default-risky derivative. Section
5 concludes with a summary and remarks on the introduction of XVAs within this approach in the
future.
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2 On the Nature of the Money Account
[Piterbarg 2010] and then [Burgard and Kjaer 2010], [Burgard and Kjaer 2013] introduced an ap-
proach for incorporating costs related to collateral and hedging of counterparty default risk into
a no-arbitrage (or risk-neutral) price of a derivative. The approach advocated basically amounts
to prescribing a structure to the money account, by ”taking inspiration” from the costs incurred
in managing a typical OTC derivative transaction on a bank’s balance sheet. No-arbitrage pric-
ing being the only mechanism (so far) for pricing derivatives neither provides foundations for, nor
supports this inspiration. Also implied is that what was known as a position in a risk-free asset
(usually proxied with a money account or a risk-free bond) can now be looked at as an account on
a bank’s balance sheet with components designed to cover the cost structure of a bank’s derivatives
position, with each component returning bank-specific premiums.
To examine this approach, we start from a most general setup by writing the prescription of a
structure to the money account as
ρM =
∑
a
Mara. (2.1)
Here, M = {Ma}na=1 are structural components of the money account accruing at different rates ra,
and ρ is the composite rate of return on the overall money account M that follows by construction.
Formally, the results in [Piterbarg 2010], [Burgard and Kjaer 2010], [Burgard and Kjaer 2013] can
be obtained by specifying terms on the right hand side of Eqn.2.1 following cost structures in these
papers (See Appendix A for details.).
So what can be said about the nature of structural components prescribed to the money account,
the accrual rates on these money account components, and the overall rate of return on the money
account itself.
We start with the standard Black-Scholes-Merton no-arbitrage pricing setup (”BSM”) ([Merton 1973]
and [Black and Scholes 1973]) as our working model. A self-financing arbitrage portfolio Π is set
up with a position hV in the derivative V and its replicating portfolio. The latter consists of a po-
sition hS in a δ dividend paying underlying security S and a position in a risk-free security, proxied
with a money account M . Using the general form of the money account distribution in Eqn.2.1
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instantaneous return on such a portfolio when it is delta-hedged is given by
dΠh˜ =
[
µV V − (µ+ δ)σV
σ
V
]
hV dt+ dM
=
[
µV V − (µ+ δ)σV
σ
V
]
hV dt+
∑
a
dMa
=
[
µV V − (µ+ δ)σV
σ
V
]
hV dt+
∑
a
Maradt
=
[
µV V − (µ+ δ)σV
σ
V
]
hV dt+ ρMdt. (2.2)
Here, being delta-hedged has its usual meaning - i.e., special weights h˜S = −σV
σ
V
S
hV and h˜V = hV
exist in the market {V, S,M}. Notice, that h˜S 6= −∂V
∂S
hV ≡ ∆hV , since we have not yet assumed
that V = V(t, S(t)). We have only assumed that both the derivative and the underlying security
price the same risk factor in all states of the world.
With a zero initial investment (z.i.i. constraint henceforth), one has
Πh˜(t) = 0⇒M = −h˜SS − h˜V V =
(σV
σ
− 1
)
hV V :=
∑
a
Ma, (2.3)
leading to the following form of Eqn.2.2
dΠh˜ =
[
µV V − (µ+ δ)σV
σ
V +
(σV
σ
− 1
)
V ρ
]
hV dt. (2.4)
Requiring the no-arbitrage prices to exist
P
[
Πh˜(t+ dt)
]
= P
[
Πh˜(t) |
Πh˜(t)=0
+dΠh˜
]
= P
[
dΠh˜ = 0
]
= 1, (2.5)
is equivalent to setting the square brackets in Eqn. 2.4 to zero. This yields the following risk-return
condition for the traded in this market derivatives and their underlying securities
µV − ρ
σV
=
(µ+ δ)− ρ
σ
. (2.6)
Eqn.2.6 is the condition for no-arbitrage prices to exist in the {V, S,M} market. It is a more
fundamental relationship than its BSM PDE representation. To arrive to a BSM PDE representation
of Eqn.2.6 and its Feynman-Kacˇ solution, one still has to make two essential assumptions - 1)
V = V (t, S(t)) and 2) V (T, S(T )) = Contractual Payoff ≡ Φ (T, S(T )). After this, using Ito’s
Lemma produces a PDE form of the Eqn.2.6
∂V
∂t
+ (ρ− δ)S∂V
∂S
+
1
2
σ2S2
∂2V
∂S2
− ρV = 0. (2.7)
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The only difference here with the classical BSM equation is the composite rate of return ρ =∑
a
Ma
M
ra for the money account.
In this sense, the no-arbitrage setup itself does not fix the rate of accrual for the money account. It
is rather the risk-free nature of the money account that dictates that its rate of accrual should be
the risk-free rate (i.e., ρ = r) to avoid arbitrage between risk-free securities (accounts), that accrue
at premium differentials to each other.
In XVA literature money accounts are sometimes constructed bottom-up. First, its components are
defined and accrual rates are assigned according to some costs structure arguments (or inspirations).
Then, the sum of these component money accounts is defined as the money account -
∑
aMa :=
M . It should be reminded, however, that the cost structure is usually outside of the replication
framework in the market, and for the z.i.i. constraint for a delta-hedged portfolio Πh˜ to hold
Πh˜ = hV V −∆hV S +M = 0, i.e., M = −hV V + ∆hV S = (∆S − V )hV , (2.8)
the {V, S,M} market has to clear
−hV V
M
+
∆hV S
M
= 1 =
∑
a
wa, where wa =
Ma
M
. (2.9)
In [Piterbarg 2010], for example, this is maintained by adding and subtracting the collateral account
for collateralized derivatives (with hV = −1)
(V − C + C)
M
− ∆S
M
=
(V − C)
M
− C
M
− ∆S
M
=
∑
a
wa = 1. (2.10)
Although this can be looked at as a mathematical identity, it implies replication of the difference
between a derivative V and its collateral account C with a position in the underlying and a risk-free
asset
V − C = ∆S + (M − C) = ∆S +M ′ , (2.11)
which does not follow from any fundamental statement about replicability of a contingent claim in
this market (collateral prices no risk factor).
More importantly, the z.i.i. constraint Eqn.2.8, which implied by the feasible replicability rela-
tionships in a given market, defines the size of the money account M and it does not prescribe a
structure Ma to it (i.e., z.i.i. constraint holds for the total of the money account).
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To study Eqn.2.6 further, let’s rewrite the instantaneous return Eqn.2.4 for the delta-hedged self-
financing arbitrage portfolio Πh˜ by combining the general form for the money account structure
Eqn.2.1 and the z.i.i. constraint Eqn.2.3
dΠh˜ =
µV − r
σV
− µ+ δ − r
σ
+
(σV
σ
− 1
)∑
awa(ra − r)
σV
hV V σV dt. (2.12)
Requiring for the arbitrage-free prices to exist (i.e., Eqn.2.5 to hold), leads to the following form of
the fundamental relation Eqn.2.6
µV − r
σV
+
(σV
σ
− 1
)∑
awa(ra − r)
σV
=
µ+ δ − r
σ
. (2.13)
The extra premium for the same level of risk σV on the left hand side of Eqn.2.13 is due to non-
zero premiums ra − r = a ≥ 0 embedded in the (risk-free) components of the money account.
It states that extra premium(s) can be earned by holding the derivative instead of a position in
the underlying.2. In other words, one hedges all of the σV in the market for the underlying, get
compensated per unit of derivative position hedged through
µV = r + (µ+ δ − r) σV
σ
= r + (µ+ δ − r)
∣∣∣∣∣ h˜SShV V
∣∣∣∣∣
h˜S=−∆hV
= r + (µ+ δ − r)
∣∣∣∣∆SV
∣∣∣∣ ,
and still makes extra premiums on top of a risk-free rate of return, despite the fact that at that
point it is a risk free portfolio itself (i.e., with weights h˜S = −∆hV ).
One can also look at the Eqn.2.12 slightly differently (leading to the same argument). No-arbitrage
pricing is effectively a proof that no-arbitrage prices exist in a given market, as opposed to a
statement that all securities in that market are traded at no-arbitrage prices. However, if an
equilibrium is attainable in the complete market {V, S,M} (i.e., all agents have been able to attain
thier optimal risk-return balances), then one should put
µV − r
σV
=
µ+ δ − r
σ
, (2.14)
and one could state that markets have cleared at no-arbitrage prices.
2One could argue that a derivative position on a security is always more volatile (more risky) than an outright
position in the underlying security and so the price of a derivative should always be greater or equal to the price of
the underlying. This would make the derivative a dominant security ([Merton 1973]), however, the dominance cannot
be due to dealer-specific cost structure add-ons to the market clearing derivative prices.
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The two arguments above imply that for the no-arbitrage prices to clear in the complete market
{V, S,M}, the second term on the left hand side of Eqn.2.13 should be zero with certainty
P[dΠh˜ =

(σV
σ
− 1
)∑
awa(ra − r)
σV
hV V dt = 0] = 1, (2.15)
leading to
ra − r = 0, for all a , and ρ = r. (2.16)
Notice that we have not made an a priori assumption that ρ = r in the derivations of Eqns.2.13 - 2.15.
In other words, if one has assumed that Ma structural components of the money account are risk-
free, then all components Ma must accrue at the risk-free rate r to avoid arbitrage - several portfolios
presumed risk-free are returning at persistently non-zero premiums with respect to each other.
Although we refer to Eqn.2.12 and Eqn.2.13 as arbitrage, the more accurate statement would be
that the market {V, S,M} does not clear the equilibrium (no-arbitrage) relation Eqn.2.13
µV − r
σV
+
(σV
σ
− 1
)∑
awa(ra − r)
σV
6= µ+ δ − r
σ
. (2.17)
Eqn.2.13 would point at arbitrage if the term
(σV
σ
− 1
)∑
awa(ra − r)
σV
on its left hand side was
generated by a market-priced security in the {V, S,M} market (as part of the replicating portfolio).
The correct equilibrium (no-arbitrage) expression is Eqn.2.14, which states that there is no extra
unit of risk-adjusted premium to be received for holding a derivative position, compared to the
outright holding of a position in the underlying, if the markets are arbitrage-free (and complete).
This does not prohibit from choosing a benchmark ρ = r +  to compare the returns from holding
a position in the derivative -
µV − ρ
σV
, or a position in the underlying -
µ+ δ − ρ
σ
, and still write
µV − r − 
σV
=
µ+ δ − r − 
σ
. (2.18)
This simply means the returns over a chosen benchmark ρ are lesser exactly by the amount of
 = ρ − r (investor specific cost above the risk-free rate). The latter has no reflection on the risk-
return equilibria in the market {V, S,M}.
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To summarize observations above, the money account can have any number of structural components
as long as
(i) each component of the money account is a risk-free account,
(ii) each component accrues at a risk-free rate, and
(iii) all these risk-free rates are the same.
Observations above and the structure of the arbitrage portfolio Π also imply that a collateral ac-
count cannot be part of the replicating portfolio either as part of the risky positions (the hedge)
because it prices no risk factor, or the money account because it’s accruing at a non-risk-free rate.
In the next section we show that observations (i) - (iii) also hold for the case of default-risky deriva-
tives, and derive pricing equations for the default-risky derivatives with and without collateral. We
show that the money account in this case is simply a bigger account compared to the case of non-
default-risky derivatives pricing of BSM.
We mention in passing, that in the case of no risk-free assets in the market the money account and
its components can only be zero-beta portfolios, accruing at the same single rate of return for a
zero-beta portfolio ([Black 1972]). Observations (i) - (iii) also hold true with respect to zero-beta
portfolios.
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3 Pricing Derivatives with Counterparty Risk
We start from the widely accepted assumption in the practitioner literature that the value of a
traded derivative depends on the bi-lateral default risk of the counterparties involved
Vˆ = Vˆ (t;S(t), JA(t), JB(t)). (3.1)
The setup3 of a self-financing arbitrage portfolio Πh in this case consists of hVˆ quantity of a derivative
instrument Vˆ on a security S, with its replicating portfolio consisting of hS quantity of the security,
hB quantity of risky bonds PB issued by the counterparty B, hA quantity of risky bonds PA issued
by counterparty A and an amount M of money account4. The value of this portfolio at time t is
Πh(t) = hSS(t) + hVˆ Vˆ (t) + hAPA(t) + hBPB(t) +M(t), (3.2)
with the instantaneous return given in terms of gain processes as
dΠh = hSdGS + hVˆ dGVˆ + hAdGA + hBdGB + dGM . (3.3)
The gain dynamics of the portfolio positions are defined as
dGS = dS + dDS = dS + δSdt = (µ+ δ)Sdt+ σSdz
dGVˆ = dVˆ + 0 = µVˆ Vˆ dt+ σVˆ Vˆ dz + ∆VˆAdJA + ∆VˆBdJB
dGA = dPA + rAPAdt = −(1−RA)P−A dJA + rAPAdt,
dGB = dPB + rBPBdt = −(1−RB)BdJB + rBPBdt,
dGM = 0 + dDM = ρMdt. (3.4)
Here, as in the previous section, we have taken M to be a money account with generic components
Ma and a composite accrual rate ρ as in Eqn.2.1. RA and RB are the recovery rates for the senior
unsecured bonds issued by counterparties A and B respectively. It is assumed that the bonds are
senior unsecured debentures to discuss the fact that derivatives go pari passu with this type of debt
in default. In general, bonds PA and PB can be any debentures issued by the counterparty, since
what is being replicated is the default risk, while the recovery levels drive the hedge ratios for full
coverage of losses in case of default.
∆VˆB and ∆VˆA are changes in the value of the derivative position due to default by the counterparty
B and counterparty A, respectively:
∆VˆB = vˆB − Vˆ (t;S, dJA = 0, dJB = 0), (3.5)
∆VˆA = vˆA − Vˆ (t;S, dJA = 0, dJB = 0),
3JA and JB are indicators of default for counterparty A and B respectively, and take value 1, if the corresponding
counterparty is in default and zero otherwise.
4Here we are following the setup in the XVA literature that originates from [Burgard and Kjaer 2010]. Fundamen-
tally, a bilateral default is replicated through a first-to-default CDS on the counterparties, since recovery is triggered
by the first default event by either of the parties.
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with vˆA and vˆB the residual values of the risky derivative Vˆ , when the counterparty A or counter-
party B is in default, respectively
vˆB(u) := Vˆ (t;S, dJA = 0, dJB = 1), (3.6)
vˆA(u) := Vˆ (t;S, dJA = 1, dJB = 0).
Plugging Eqn.3.4 into the instantaneous return equation Eqn.3.3 yields to the following
dΠh =
[
hS(µ+ δ)S + hVˆ µVˆ V
]
dt+ [hBrBPB + hArAPA] dt+ ρMdt (3.7)
+
[
hSσS + hVˆ σVˆ V
]
dz
+ (1−RB)
[
hVˆ Vˆ
∆VˆB
Vˆ (1−RB)
− hBPB
]
dJB
+ (1−RA)
[
hVˆ Vˆ
∆VˆA
Vˆ (1−RA)
− hAPA
]
dJA.
Observe now, that
∆VˆA
Vˆ
and
∆VˆB
Vˆ
are negative numbers and are percentage drops in the value of
the derivative position due to defaults by A and B, respectively. Hence, define recovery rates
χB and χA for the derivative position as
∆VˆB
Vˆ
= −(1− χB), and ∆VˆA
Vˆ
= −(1− χA).
We further introduce loss ratios zA and zB - the ratio of loss rate from a derivative position
to loss rate from a bond position of a counterparty
zA =
1− χA
1−RA , and zB =
1− χB
1−RB .
In other words, we are modeling recovery rates from the derivative position as a percentage of the
value of the default-risky derivative prior to default
vˆA = χAVˆ (t;S, dJA = 0, dJB = 0), (3.8)
vˆB = χBVˆ (t;S, dJA = 0, dJB = 0). (3.9)
Rewriting Eqn.3.7 with these new notations one arrives to
dΠh =
[
hS(µ+ δ)S + hVˆ µVˆ V + hBrBPB + hArAPA
]
dt+Mρdt
+
[
hSσS + hVˆ σVˆ V
]
dz
+ (1−RB)
[
−hVˆ Vˆ zB − hBPB
]
dJB
+ (1−RA)
[
−hVˆ Vˆ zA − hAPA
]
dJA. (3.10)
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If the market
{
Vˆ , S, PA, PB,M
}
clears, then the the z.i.i. constraint
Πh = hSS + hVˆ Vˆ + hBPB + hAPA +M = 0, (3.11)
is a constraint on portfolio weights h such that satisfy
−h′SS − h
′
Vˆ
Vˆ − h′BPB − h
′
APA = M. (3.12)
Plugging into Eqn.3.10 one arrives to the following expression for the instantaneous return on such
portfolio
dΠh
′
=
[
h
′
S(µ+ δ − ρ)S + h
′
Vˆ
µVˆ V
]
dt (3.13)
+
[
h
′
B(rB − ρ)PB + h
′
A(rA − ρ)PA
]
dt
+
[
h
′
SσS + h
′
Vˆ
σVˆ V
]
dz
+ (1−RB)
[
−zBh′Vˆ Vˆ − h
′
BPB
]
dJB
+ (1−RA)
[
−zAh′Vˆ Vˆ − h
′
APA
]
dJA.
It is easy to see now, that a portfolio strategy5
h˜ =
{
−∆h′
Vˆ
, h
′
Vˆ
,−zB Vˆ
P−B
h
′
Vˆ
,−zA Vˆ
P−A
h
′
Vˆ
, 1
}
(3.14)
that satisfies the z.i.i. constraint Eqn.3.11
M =
(
∆S − Vˆ + zBVˆ + zAVˆ
)
h
′
Vˆ
, (3.15)
will make instantaneous return on such portfolio equal to
dΠh
′
|h′=h˜=
[
(µVˆ − ρ)Vˆ −∆(µ+ δ − ρ)S − zB(rB − ρ)Vˆ − zA(rA − ρ)Vˆ
]
h
′
Vˆ
dt (3.16)
with certainty.
We rewrite the delta-hedging weights explicitly for a later use
h˜S = −∆h′Vˆ , and h˜Vˆ = h
′
Vˆ
; (3.17)
5We have used the fact that Vˆ = Vˆ (t;S(t), JA(t), JB(t)) and so
σVˆ
σ
Vˆ
S
=
∂Vˆ
∂S
≡ ∆.
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h˜A = −zA
Vˆ h
′
Vˆ
PA
= − (1− χA)
(1−RA)
Vˆ h
′
Vˆ
PA
, (3.18)
h˜B = −zB
Vˆ h
′
Vˆ
PB
= − (1− χB)
(1−RB)
Vˆ h
′
Vˆ
PB
. (3.19)
Satisfying the no-arbitrage conditions
P
[
Πh˜(t+ dt)
]
= P
[
Πh˜(t) |
Πh˜(t)=0
+dΠh˜
]
= P
[
dΠh˜ = 0
]
= 1 (3.20)
is now equivalent to setting
(µVˆ − ρ)Vˆ −∆(µ+ δ − ρ)S − zB(rB − ρ)Vˆ − zA(rA − ρ)Vˆ = 0. (3.21)
If one assumes that the market
{
Vˆ , S, PA, PB,M
}
is frictionless (no material liquidity premiums),
complete and risk-neutrally priced, then
E [dJA] ≈ λAdt and E [dJB] ≈ λBdt, with (3.22)
rA − r = (1−RA)λA and rB − r = (1−RB)λB, (3.23)
and following the arguments in Section 2 for Eqns.2.13 - 2.15, ρ− r = ∑awa(ra − r) = 0.
This leads to the following form of the fundamental no-arbitrage relationship Eqn.2.6 for the case
of default-risky derivatives6
µVˆ − [(1− χA)λA + (1− χB)λB]− r
σV
=
(µ+ δ)− r
σ
, or
µV − r
σV
=
(µ+ δ)− r
σ
, (3.24)
where µV = µVˆ − [(1− χA)λA + (1− χB)λB] is the expected return on an otherwise identical
default-risk-free derivative V (t, S(t)).
Eqn.3.24 is a no-arbitrage condition for the market
{
Vˆ , S, PA, PB,M
}
and it states that if default
risk between two default-risky counterparties can be replicated through bilateral exchange of bonds
that are also traded in the market (mutually shorting bonds), then after a market-priced ad-
justment for the bilateral default risk there is no extra unit of risk-adjusted premium to be
6Notice that λA,B are not the same as in [Burgard and Kjaer 2010], as the rate of return on collateral account rC
is not the risk-free rate - rC 6= r.
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obtained for holding a default-risky derivative position, instead of holding an outright position in
the underlying, if the markets are arbitrage-free (and complete).
In contrast, prescribing a structure to the money account M , using the anzats Eqn.2.1 leads to
µVˆ − [(1− χA)λA + (1− χB)λB]− r
σV
+
[(σV
σ
− 1
)
+
1− χA
1−RA +
1− χB
1−RB
]∑
awa(ra − r)
σV
6= (µ+ δ)− r
σ
, or
µV − r
σV
+
[(σV
σ
− 1
)
+
1− χA
1−RA +
1− χB
1−RB
]∑
awa(ra − r)
σV
6= (µ+ δ)− r
σ
, (3.25)
which does not hold for the same reasons discussed in Section 2 for the case of no default risk.
The market
{
Vˆ , S, PA, PB,M
}
simply does not clear no-arbitrage prices of a derivative and its
replicating portfolio in a way that Eqn.3.25 between the risk premia in that market would hold.
Eqn.3.24 can also be written in a PDE presentation using Ito’s Lemma for Vˆ µVˆ and Vˆ σVˆ in the
standard form with the assumption Eqn.3.1
L(r−δ)Vˆ − rVˆ = [(1− χB)λB + (1− χA)λA] Vˆ , (3.26)
where, for the brevity of expressions, we have adopted the notation7
L(x−y)Vˆ := ∂Vˆ
∂t
+ (x− y)S∂Vˆ
∂S
+
1
2
σ2S2
∂2Vˆ
∂S2
. (3.27)
With the appropriate terminal conditions one can write a Feynman-Kacˇ solution for Eqn.3.26 as
follows
Vˆ (t, S(t), JA(t), JB(t)) = EQ [Zr(t, T )Φ(T, S(T ))] (3.28)
− EQ
[
Zr(t, u) (1− χB)λB(u)Vˆ (T − (t+ u), S(u))du
]
− EQ
[
Zr(t, u) (1− χA)λA(u)Vˆ (T − (t+ u), S(u))du
]
,
7Formally, one could still write a PDE form for the expression Eqn.3.25
L(ρ−δ)Vˆ − ρVˆ = [zB(rB − ρ) + zA(rA − ρ)] Vˆ ,
but its solution will not represent a no-arbitrage price of a derivative that is cleared by a complete market.
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with the simplified notation Zr(t, T ) = e
− ∫ Tt r(τ)dτ .
Eqn.3.26 can also be re-written as
L(r−δ)Vˆ − [r + (1− χB)λB + (1− χA)λA] Vˆ = 0, (3.29)
resulting in a different form of the Feynman-Kacˇ solution
Vˆ (t, S(t), JA(t), JB(t)) = EQ
[
e−
∫ T
t [r(τ)+(1−χB)λB(τ)+(1−χA)λA(τ)]dτΦ(T, S(T ))
]
. (3.30)
The following observations are in order.
(A). Eqn.3.26 and Eqn.3.29 that price default risky bonds (see, for example [Duffie and Singleton 1999])
are also the equations that price default risky derivatives. Notice, that only contractual cash-
flows enter the expressions. Differences with pricing a risky bond come only from
- the bi-lateral nature of the default event8, and
- the recovery rate for a derivative.
(B). The money account in the case of default-risky derivatives is simply a bigger account compared
to the case of non-default-risky derivatives pricing of BSM
M =
(
∆S − Vˆ + zBVˆ + zAVˆ
)
h
′
Vˆ
=
(
∆S − Vˆ
)
h
′
Vˆ
+
(
zBVˆ + zAVˆ
)
h
′
Vˆ
:= MBSM +MDefaultrisk, (3.31)
whereMBSM =
(
∆S − Vˆ
)
h
′
Vˆ
is the money account from the BSM pricing of non-default-risky
derivatives and MDefaultrisk =
(
zBVˆ + zAVˆ
)
h
′
Vˆ
is an additional money account component
due to the default risk, both accruing at the risk-free rate
rM = rMBSM + rMDefaultrisk. (3.32)
In the language of Section 2 one has a composite accrual rate for the money account ρ =
MBSM
M
rBSM +
MDefaultrisk
M
rDefaultrisk, but with rBSM = rDefaultrisk = r, so it satisfies
ρ− r = ∑awa(ra − r) = 0.
In other words, - they are of the same risk-free nature as the money account as a whole,
and are accruing at the same risk-free rate.
8See also [Duffie and Huang 1996] and the references therein for the bi-lateral nature of default risk in derivatives.
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In the next section we take a closer look at the two main differences between the pricing PDE
Eqn.3.26 and its bond counterparts - the bi-lateral nature of default and recovery rates for deriva-
tive positions. We also demonstrate how collateral enters the pricing equations as a parameter,
consistent with the observations above that collateral cannot be part of the replicating portfolio ei-
ther as part of the hedging positions because it prices no risk factor, or the money account because
it’s accruing at a non-risk-free rate.
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4 Bilateral Default, Recovery Rates for Derivatives and Collateral
While the default risk between two trading counterparties is always bilateral in nature, the price
of the derivative traded does not have to be. Starting from an assumption that the price of a
derivative depends on the bilateral default risk of the counterparties involved (Eqn.3.1), presumes
that in general a derivative (its contractual payoff function) may generate liability cashflows for both
counterparties. However, if a) the payoff function (contractual cashflows) of a derivative gives rise to
liability cashflows to only one of the counterparties, or b) the liability cashflows of counterparties are
separable with certainty (i.e., the payoff function is linear in the two streams of liability cashflows),
then Eqn.3.26 translates into separate unilateral default-risky equations for the counterparties A
and B
L(r−δ)VˆA,B − rVˆA,B = (1− χA,B)λA,BVˆA,B. (4.1)
Here VˆA and VˆB are the prices for derivatives, the payoff function for which are the liability cash-
flows due from the counterparty A - ΦA(T, S(T )) and counterparty B - ΦB(T, S(T )), respectively
9.
In general, where separability of liability cashflows cannot be achieved, one needs a more general
form of the Eqn.3.26
L(r−δ)Vˆ − rVˆ = λB
(
Vˆ − vˆB
)
+ λA
(
Vˆ − vˆA
)
. (4.2)
Here vˆA and vˆB are the residual values of the (same) derivative contract when counterparty A or
counterparty B is in default respectively, as defined in Eqn.3.6. Hence, we rewrite the Feynman-Kacˇ
solution for Eqn.4.2 as
Vˆ (t, S(t), JA(t), JB(t)) = EQ [Zr(t, T )Φ(T, S(T ))] (4.3)
− EQ
[∫ T
t
Zr(t, u)λB(u)
(
Vˆ (u)− vˆB(u)
)
du
]
− EQ
[∫ T
t
Zr(t, u)λA(u)
(
Vˆ (u)− vˆA(u)
)
du
]
.
Estimation of vˆA and vˆB depends on the applicability and existence of one of the two mechanisms
- replacement, or recovery.
In a replacement paradigm the following two cases are of interest.
Case 1. Assume there is a market mechanism for providing counterparty replacement (both for
defaulted and solvent counterparties) and all market participants pay the same price for a given
9The trade can be treated as a structured deal, each component priced as a unilateral default-risky derivative - no
need for considering bi-lateral expressions.
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contractual stream of cashflows (similar to the pre-crisis setup).
In this case, the derivative contract Vˆ (u) = Vˆ (T − (t+u), S(u)) at any intermediate time u ∈ [t, T ]
can be replaced by an identical one with any other counterparty during the life of the derivative
vˆA(u) = vˆB(u) = Vˆ (u) = Vˆ (T − (t+ u), S(u)). (4.4)
The default-risk terms in the Feynman-Kacˇ solution Eqn.4.3 vanish, leading to
Vˆ (t, S(t), JA(t), JB(t)) = EQ [Zr(t, T )Φ(T, S(T ))] = V (t, S(t)). (4.5)
This outcome is equivalent (at least mechanically) to relaxing the assumption that the price of a
derivative that promises a given stream of cashflow depends on the default risk of the counterparties
trading it.
The experience of the 2007-2009 financial crisis showed that assuming an a priori existence of a
market mechanism for replacement can be a material presumption.
Case 2. Assume there is no market mechanism for providing a replacement counterparty, but it is
possible to replace the derivative contract with an identical one with another solvent counterparty
C, and the price at which this replacement is available depends (bilaterally) on the default risk of
the parties involved (similar to the post-crisis setup).
If VˆX,Y is the value of a default-risky derivative contract that pays Φ(T, S(T )) at maturity between
two solvent counterparties X and Y , then one can set
Vˆ (u) = Vˆ (u;S, dJA = 0, dJB = 0) := VˆA,B(u), as a notation; (4.6)
vˆB(u) = Vˆ (u;S, dJA = 0, dJB = 1) := VˆA,C(u), as a replacement when B is in default;
vˆA(u) = Vˆ (u;S, dJA = 1, dJB = 0) := VˆB,C(u), as a replacement when A is in default.
With these notations one then has for the Feynman-Kacˇ solution Eqn.4.3
Vˆ (t;S(t), JA(t), JB(t)) = EQ [Zr(t, T )Φ(T, S(T ))] (4.7)
− EQ
[∫ T
t
Zr(t, u)λB(u)
(
VˆA,B(u)− VˆA,C(u)
)
du
]
− EQ
[∫ T
t
Zr(t, u)λA(u)
(
VˆA,B(u)− VˆB,C(u)
)
du
]
.
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One can also rewrite Eqn.4.7 as
Vˆ (t;S(t), JA(t), JB(t)) = EQ [Zr(t, T )Φ(T, S(T ))] (4.8)
− EQ
[∫ T
t
Zr(t, u) [λA(u) + λB(u)] VˆA,B(u)du
]
− EQ
[∫ T
t
Zr(t, u)
[
VˆA,C(u)λB(u) + VˆB,C(u)λA(u)
]
du
]
.
The last term can be interpreted as the replacement cost of replacing the derivative contract with
an identical one with counterparty C. Notice, however, that there is no feasible way of knowing
the new counterparty C a priori, and it will not be possible to transact at an unknown exit price
VˆA,C(u) or VˆB,C(u). Notice also that this would have not been an issue, were we to keep the pre-
crisis assumption that the inter-dealer market is made up of counterparties with (approximately)
same credit quality10, i.e. VˆA,C = VˆB,C .
We argue that when either
(a) there is no market mechanism that guarantees a counterparty allowing to price derivatives at
zero loss - vˆA,B(u) = Vˆ (u), or
(b) the replacement counterparty is not known a priori and the loss amount Vˆ (u) − vˆA,B(u) is
ill-defined,
estimation of vˆA and vˆB requires a change of paradigm from replacement to recovery, where
recovery parameters for the use in pricing formulas are estimated exogenously.
Unfortunately, estimation of the recovery rates for derivative positions can itself be a convoluted one
due to netting and offsetting clauses, where the actual exposures at default and their netted position
are not readily (or a priori) available (see for example [Brigo and Morini 2010] and [XVA Books]).
What goes pari passu with senior unsecured debt in resolution procedures is the netted cashflow
on the portfolio of transactions at the time of default. Let ϕnet be the netted expected cashflows
between the counterparties, and let’s denote it as v+ when it is an asset to the counterparty A and
as v− when it is an asset to the counterparty B
v+ = max [ϕnet, 0] ,
v− = min [ϕnet, 0] . (4.9)
In the recovery paradigm, where derivatives go pari passu with the senior unsecured debt (and there
is no collateral), one can put
vˆA = RAv
+, and
vˆB = RBv
−. (4.10)
10[Duffie and Huang 1996] estimated that there was barely a 1bp spread that could be attributed to the bi-lateral
default in interest rate swap transactions (pre-crisis).
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The amount ϕnet is the only quantity to which recovery rates RA and RB from the unsecured debt
of counterparties can be applied.
The XVA literature largely assumes that unsecured senior debt recovery rates RA and RB are rea-
sonable estimates of choice for the recovery rates χA and χB for a single derivative instrument,
mainly due to the pari passu status of the latter.
On the other hand, from the standpoint of estimating recovery rates from risk-neutral prices (ex-
pectation of contractual cash flows) it is tempting to set the recovery rates for derivatives as a
percentage of the pre-default value of the default-risky derivative
vˆA = χAVˆ , and
vˆB = χBVˆ . (4.11)
This, of course, recovers the familiar expression of Eqn.3.28 for a default-risky derivative
Vˆ (t;S(t), JA(t), JB(t)) = EQ [Zr(t, T )Φ(T, S(T ))] (4.12)
− EQ
[∫ T
t
Zr(t, u) [(1− χB)λB(u) + (1− χA)λA(u)] Vˆ (T − (t+ u), S(u))du
]
.
In general, recovery rates are estimated from unsecured defaults and are counterparty specific func-
tions of the structure and quality of defaulted counterparty’s balance sheet - capital structure and
residual value of assets11, generally not observable from market prices. Collateral agreements can
be put in place to make the recovery levels as predictable as possible. Collateralization does not
have to make the recovery rate equal to one. Estimation of recovery rates is exogenous to pricing
processes.
For the recovery paradigm with collateralization recovery rate χ for a derivative has to be
adjusted for collateral to make the estimated recovery rate that of an unsecured senior debt, so that
at default the mark-to-market values Vˆ can go pari passu with the unsecured senior debt.
In the recovery paradigm with collateralization one can estimate vˆA and vˆB as follows. If we assume
netted collateral posting and collection, then there is a C(u) amount of collateral available to the
solvent party at the time of default. If the position is over-collateralized - Vˆ (u) < C(u), then
recovery is the value of the derivative, otherwise it is the collateral amount plus recovery from the
unsecured portion - C(u) + χA,B(Vˆ (u) − C(u)). This can be presented in a combined manner as
11Strictly speaking, because of the exogenous nature of this process it is difficult to refer to Eqn.4.12 as risk-
neutral price, unless its second term (or its components) is implied from market prices (see also [Brigo 2018] and
[Risk.net 2017]), analogous to bond markets, where the expected loss premium can be implied by the difference
between default-risky and default-risk-free bond prices.
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follows12
vˆA = (Vˆ − C)− + χA(Vˆ − C)+ + C,
vˆB = (Vˆ − C)− + χB(Vˆ − C)+ + C. (4.13)
Here x+ = max(x, 0) and x− = min(x, 0).
This leads to collateral-adjusted derivatives recovery rates χ˜A and χ˜B
1− χ˜A(CA) = −∆VˆA
Vˆ
=
Vˆ − (Vˆ − C)− − χA(Vˆ − C)+ − C
Vˆ
= (1− χA)
(
Vˆ − C
)+
Vˆ
= (1− k)+ (1− χA) , (4.14)
1− χ˜B(CB) = −∆VˆB
Vˆ
=
Vˆ − (Vˆ − C)+ − χB(Vˆ − C)+ − C
Vˆ
= (1− χB)
(
Vˆ − C
)+
Vˆ
= (1− k)+ (1− χB) , (4.15)
with k =
C
Vˆ
as the level of collateralization for the transaction. This also makes the hedge ratios in
Eqn.3.18 and Eqn.3.19 explicitly proportional to the non-collateralized portion of the derivative
h˜cA = −(1− k)+zA
h
′
Vˆ
Vˆ
PA
, (4.16)
h˜cB = −(1− k)+zB
h
′
Vˆ
Vˆ
PB
. (4.17)
Thus, one arrives to the collateral-adjusted form of the main equation Eqn.3.26 for the price of
a collateralized default-risky derivative
L(r−δ)Vˆ − rVˆ = [(1− χ˜A)λA + (1− χ˜B)λB] Vˆ
= [(1− χA)λA + (1− χB)λB] (1− k)+ Vˆ , (4.18)
with the corresponding Feynman-Kacˇ solution
Vˆ (t;S(t), JA(t), JB(t)) = EQ [Zr(t, T )Φ(T, S(T ))] (4.19)
− EQ
[∫ T
t
Zr(t, u) [(1− χB)λB + (1− χA)λA] (1− k)+ Vˆ (u)du
]
, or
12Note that these are not the recovery expressions widely used in the XVA literature. Here vˆA,B(χA,B , C = 0) =
χA,BVˆ as in Eqn.4.11, because Vˆ as a price is kept positive. It does not carry an asset (”+”) or liability (”-”) sign
implicitly.
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Vˆ (t;S(t), JA(t), JB(t)) = EQ [Zr(t, T )Φ(T, S(T ))] (4.20)
− EQ
[∫ T
t
Zr(t, u) [(1− χB)λB + (1− χA)λA]
(
Vˆ (u)− C(u)
)+
du
]
If the posted collateral is not allowed to be netted (e.g., when collateralization includes initial mar-
gins) the collateralization level k acquires a counterparty subscript - kA =
C + IA
Vˆ
and kB =
C + IB
Vˆ
,
where the level of collateralization includes the initial margin collateral amounts IA and IB.
With a non-netted initial margin the Feynman-Kacˇ expression Eqn.4.20 obtains the following form13
Vˆ (t;S(t), JA(t), JB(t)) = EQ [Zr(t, T )Φ(T, S(T ))] (4.21)
− EQ
[∫ T
t
Zr(t, u) (1− χB)λB
(
Vˆ (u)− C(u)− IB(u)
)+
du
]
− EQ
[∫ T
t
Zr(t, u) (1− χA)λA
(
Vˆ (u)− C(u)− IA(u)
)+
du
]
.
In summary, the expression Eqn.4.21 for a no-arbitrage price of a default-risky collateralized deriva-
tive implies that:
- no-arbitrage prices for default-risky derivatives should price the unsecured portion
of the default-risky derivative, with unsecured recovery rates, if they are to be pari
passu with the senior unsecured debt,
- applying senior unsecured debt recovery rates to pricing of a single derivative is
generally not accurate, as these rates should be applied to the closeout netted exposures
at default that go pari passu to senior unsecured debt (an exception could be the simple case
where exposures are unilateral),
- the collateral cannot be part of dynamic variables in the replicating portfolio,
either as part of the risky positions (the hedge) because it prices no risk factor, or the money
account because it’s accruing at a non-risk-free rate,
- collateral is part of an exogenously estimated parameter - the recovery rate, which
is generally dependent on the capital structure and the residual value of the assets, both
unobservable to the market.
The last two points on collateral make intuitive sense.
13More accurately, though, cash collateral amounts C(u) and IA,B(u) at the intermediate times u are from the
previous time interval u− δu (See also [Pykhtin e´t al]).
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There were no market-priced securities in the replicating portfolio that priced the recovery risk
directly in all states of the world. Stated otherwise, the self-financing replicating portfolio was
set up in a market that did not have securities that were perfectly correlated with a recovery risk
factor. For the same reason it does not help introducing new dynamic risk factors to model the
recovery rates χA and χB. This constitutes an incomplete market, causing semi-replication. Such
risks can only be mitigated (collateralization and/or guarantees) through means outside the market
transactions14, not fully hedged.
This semi-replication should not be confused with the case in [Burgard and Kjaer 2013]. The latter
approach cannot be called a semi-replication as it simply is a voluntary under-hedging of the default
risk of the issuer of the derivative by choosing different from the full replication weights. In other
words, the market in [Burgard and Kjaer 2013] is still complete15.
This is easily observed if one rewrites the full replication weights h˜ in Eqn.3.17 - 3.19 in notations
of [Burgard and Kjaer 2013]
hA,BPA,B −RA,BhA,BPA,B := PA,B − PDA,B, with h
′
Vˆ
= 1, leading to
h˜S = −∆h′Vˆ , and h˜Vˆ = h
′
Vˆ
; ⇐⇒ h˜S = −∆, and h˜Vˆ = 1; (4.22)
h˜A = −zA
Vˆ h
′
Vˆ
P−A
=
(1− χA)Vˆ
(1−RA)P−A
h
′
Vˆ
, ⇐⇒ PA − PDA = −∆VˆA = Vˆ − gA; (4.23)
h˜B = −zB
Vˆ h
′
Vˆ
P−B
=
(1− χB)Vˆ
(1−RB)P−B
h
′
Vˆ
, ⇐⇒ PB − PDB = −∆VˆB = Vˆ − gB. (4.24)
[Burgard and Kjaer 2013] choose V − gA = FullHedgeWeight − , ”taking inspiration from fund-
ing considerations”. Not choosing the full replication weights h˜ creates an arbitrage opportunity
between holding a derivative position of a counterparty against a portfolio of counterparty’s bonds.
There is also no reason that would follow from no-arbitrage pricing for the specific choices of the
bonds and their recovery rates in [Burgard and Kjaer 2013] (zero recovery for one counterparty and
subordinated debt for the other). The full replication is achievable with any portfolio of counter-
party A bonds. If we are interpreting the recovery rates RA and RB as the recovery percentage per
dollar of a senior unsecured exposure, and the derivative positions go pari passu with the unsecured
senior debt of the defaulted counterparty (which they do), then one puts χA = RA and χB = RB
and arrives to hedge ratios with zA = zB = 1. If the counterparty defaults are hedged using any
other combination of the defaulted counterparty’s bonds, then the hedge ratios are adjusted accord-
ingly. For example, for hedging with subordinated debt one has zA,B < 1 for the hedge ratios since
14Or, perhaps, capitalization with a bank’s balance sheet, to complete the market.
15A better terminology probably would be incomplete replication in complete markets, as opposed to semi-replication
in incomplete markets.
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subordinated debt recovers less than the senior debt to which derivatives are pari passu. We discuss
the approach in [Burgard and Kjaer 2013] in more detail in Appendix B, as it is used widely for
deriving XVA expressions (see, for example [Green and Kenyon 2015]).
Finally, it is worth noting, that collateralization can also play a systemic role. One could
redefine closeout rules to limit the entitlement of the derivatives recovery exclusively
to the recovery from collateral accounts, with no further recourse to the assets of the defaulted
counterparty. This would decouple derivatives trading from the rest of bank’s deposit funded bal-
ance sheet (e.g., no ring-fencing would be necessary).
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5 Closing Remarks
Following the approach in [Piterbarg 2010] and [Burgard and Kjaer 2013] market participants have
generated adjustments to derivatives pricing formulas to reflect funding and hedging costs, collec-
tively referred to as XVAs. In a separate effort [Brigo e´t al 2017] show that these costs can also be
recovered if they are assigned as dividends to the replicating market securities. However, in either
approach there seems to be no market that would clear these dividend or cost components as part
of no-arbitrage prices. In either case requiring XVAs to be included into a price of a derivative
effectively amounts to what’s referred to as ”donations” in [Andersen, Duffie and Song 2017].
In this paper we have shown that XVAs do not originate from no-arbitrage pricing16 as they are
not part of a self-financing replicating portfolio of market traded securities (there is no market that
clears the prices with XVAs as dividends).
Recently, there have been notable attempts to bring XVAs into the corporate finance and accounting
frameworks ([Andersen, Duffie and Song 2017], [Albanese e´t al 2014, 2015, 2017] and [Kjaer 2017]).
In a forthcoming paper [Tumasyan 2019] we will discuss these efforts and will formulate an ap-
proach for recovering XVAs as P&L measures of balance sheet consumption for a derivative
transaction on a bank’s balance sheet, with no reference to no-arbitrage (risk-neutral) pricing.
We will also argue, that adding XVAs as costs to the price of a derivative transforms
derivatives from a market traded instrument into a banking instrument (contractual
cash flows discounted by an all-in yield).
16Although formally, setting the second and third terms in Eqn.4.21 equal to CV A+DV A recovers some members
of the familiar XVA family.
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Appendix
A Money Accounts in [Piterbarg 2010] & [Burgard and Kjaer 2010]
We explicitly expand the money accounts in [Piterbarg 2010] and [Burgard and Kjaer 2010].
To arrive to the results of [Piterbarg 2010]
LV − δS ∂V
∂S
= −rRS∂V
∂S
+ rCC + rF (V − C) (A.1)
one has to solve the z.i.i. constraint (Eqn.2.8) with hVˆ = −1, and add and subtract the collateral
account
M = −∆S + (V − C) + C. (A.2)
The addition and subtraction of the collateral account generates the money account components
MR, MF and MC which are then assigned accrual rates ra, a = C,F,R, motivated by the following
cost structure:
MR = −∆S amount of the underlying security borrowed at the repo rate rR, with dividend income
of δ;
dMR = (rR − δ)MRdt;
MF = V − C amount to be borrowed/lent unsecured from the treasury desk for collateral, which
accrues at the funding rate of rF
dMF = rFMFdt;
MC = C the collateral account that accrues at the collateral rate of rC ;
dMF = rCMCdt.
For the money account in [Piterbarg 2010] the standard no-arbitrage conditions in Eqn.2.5 lead to
µV − (µ+ δ)σV
σ
=
1
V
∑
a=C,F,R
Mara,
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which means that one needs to put
1
V
∑
a
Mara +
σV
σ
r
?
= r, or
1
V
∑
a
Mara
?
= r
(
1− σV
σ
)
= r
V −∆S
V
, or
∑
a=C,F,R
Ma
V −∆S ra
?
= r. (A.3)
This means (the z.i.i. constraint Eqn.A.2 holds)∑
a=C,F,R
Ma∑
a=C,F,RMa
=
∑
a=C,F,R
wa = 1, (A.4)
and consequently for Eqn.A.3∑
a=C,F,R
wara
?
= r, or
∑
a=C,F,R
wa (ra − r) ?= 0. (A.5)
Eqn.A.5 states that the ”portfolio of funding accounts” that gives the money account a structure
in [Piterbarg 2010] has to be a risk-free (or zero beta ) portfolio.
The arguments above apply to the case of [Burgard and Kjaer 2010] with the following definitions
for the money account components.
• Split the funding component MF of the money account into two pieces to account for any
surplus or shortfall cash held by the seller after the own bonds have been purchased:(
−Vˆ −∆VˆB
)+
surplus cash held by the seller after the own bonds have been purchased
accruing at risk-free rate r;
dM+F = rM
+
F dt;(
−Vˆ −∆VˆB
)−
shortfall that needs to be funded through borrowing, at the financing rate of
rF
dM−F = rFM
−
F dt;
• MR = −∆S an account for the underlying security borrowed, accruing at the repo rate q,
provides a dividend income of δ;
dMR = (rR − δ)MRdt;
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• MC an account for the proceeds of shorting the counterparty bond through a repurchase
agreement at rate r (it is assumed that the haircut in this repo is zero, so that the repo rate
for the counterparty bond can be replaced with a risk-free rate)
dMC = rMCdt.
With these notations equations Eqn.A.3 - Eqn.A.5 follow for the case of [Burgard and Kjaer 2010].
B The Case of Semi-Replication in [Burgard and Kjaer 2013]
We discuss the semi-replication approach introduced in [Burgard and Kjaer 2013], since this ap-
proach is used widely for deriving KVA and MVA expressions (as in [Green and Kenyon 2015]).
The approach cannot be called a semi-replication as it simply amounts to under-hedging the default
risk of the ”issuer” of the derivative by choice.
We will apply the no-arbitrage pricing approach in the main body of the paper to [Burgard and Kjaer 2013],
to show that the semi-replication in this paper allows arbitrage.
B.1 Semi-Replication - a Misnomer
[Burgard and Kjaer 2013] set up a ”hedge portfolio” Π (not the same as Πh above) as
Π(t) = q(t) · h(t) = hSS + hAPA + hBPB +M − C (B.1)
with a strategy that V +Π = 0.17. Then Ψ := V +Π is the arbitrage portfolio Πh above with hV = 1.
[Burgard and Kjaer 2013] introduce a money account distribution as M = MS+MB, where MS and
MB are assumed to be ”financing” the S and PB positions respectively. The latter interpretation
provides the justification for extra constraints
hBPB +MB = 0
hSS +MS = 0. (B.2)
With Eqn.B.2 the z.i.i. constraint for Ψ looks as follows
Ψ = V + Π = V + hSS +MS︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
+hAPA + hBPB +MB︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
−C = V + hAPA − C = 0. (B.3)
17”...except, possibly, at issuer default” -note by the authors.
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Using Eqn.B.2, the dynamics of the money accounts MS and MB are assigned rates of return along
lines of the financing arguments, with q and qB the repo rates for financing the S and PB positions:
dMS = rMSdt = −rhSSdt −→ − (q − δ)hSSdt;
dMB = rMBdt = −rhBPBdt −→ −qBhBPBdt. (B.4)
[Burgard and Kjaer 2013] then write the instantaneous return for the self-financing portfolio Ψ as
dΨ = dV + dΠ = dV + hSdS + hAdPA + hBdPB + dMS + dMB − dC. (B.5)
Plugging in the price dynamics into Eqn.B.5 and using the notations from [Burgard and Kjaer 2013]
for hA,BPA −RAhA,BPA := PA,B − PDA,B leads to
dΨ = dV + hSdS + [rAPA + hB (rB − qB)PB + (δ − q)hSS − rCC] dt
+
[
PDA − PA
]
dJA +
[
PDB − PB
]
dJB. (B.6)
Now, recalling Eqn.B.3 and choosing RB = 0⇒ PDB = 0 leads to the following expression for dΨ18
dΨ = dV + dΠ = [µV V + hSµS + rAPA + hB (rB − qB)PB + (δ − q)hSS − rCC] dt
+ [σV V + hSσS] dz
+
[
PDA − C + gA
]
dJA + [∆VB − hBPB] dJB. (B.7)
where we have used ∆VA = gA − V .
One can of course require that all the terms in Eqn.B.7 be set equal to zero to avoid arbitrage,
however, we will follow the paper by setting
hS = −σV
σ
V
S
= −∆, (B.8)
hB =
∆VB
PB
, and (B.9)
hA = P
D
A − C + gA =  6= 0. (B.10)
With these new notations, for the delta-hedged portfolio Ψ = V + Π one can write
dΨ = dV + dΠ = [µV V −∆µS + rAPA + (rB − qB) ∆VB − (δ − q) ∆S − rCC] dt
+
[
PDA − C + gA
]
dJA. (B.11)
Using the expression for µV V , adopting the notations rB−qB = λB19, sC = rC−r,  = PDA −C+gA
and using the remaining z.i.i constraint Eqn.B.3 one arrives to the following main expression of
[Burgard and Kjaer 2013]
dΨ = dV + dΠ =
[
Lq−δV − sCC − (r + λA + λB)V + (gA − )λA + gBλB
]
dt
+ dJA. (B.12)
18Notice, that at this point there is no particular reason for choosing RB = 0.
19Note that λ here is different from the one in previous sections, it is defined with respect to qB .
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[Burgard and Kjaer 2013] state that ”We assume that the issuer wants the strategy described above
to evolve in a self-financed fashion while he is alive”, and that ”This implies that the issuer requires
the total drift term of dV + dΠ to be zero.”
This produces a PDE in [Burgard and Kjaer 2013] from which XVA expressions in the literature
are derived and interpreted by others (e.g., [Green and Kenyon 2015]).
Let’s notice now that the no-arbitrage conditions for the self-financing portfolio Ψ = V + Π with
Ψ(t) = 0 would imply that arbitrage exists even if one sets the drift term in Eqn.B.12 to zero, since
the probability of default for the counterparty A is non-zero - Prob[dJA = 1] > 0, and there is
always an  such that
P [Ψ(t+ dt) > 0] = P [dJA > 0] > 0, and (B.13)
P [Ψ(t+ dt) ≥ 0] = P [dJA ≥ 0] = 1. (B.14)
Moreover, due to the ”abridged” version of the z.i.i. constraint Eqn.B.3{
Ψ = Vˆ + P−A − C = 0
gA + PD − C = . =⇒ Vˆ − gA + P
−
A − PD = −.
one can write[
gA − Vˆ + PDA − P−A
]
dJA = dJA 6= 0. (B.15)
Eqn.B.15 means that there is an arbitrage opportunity in holding the derivative position vs. the
positions in bonds, or vise-versa.
The reason for this is, of course, clear - it is due to the choice of hedge ratios Eqn.B.8 , instead of
the full hedge ratios h˜A,B in Eqn.3.18 and Eqn.3.19. We can rewrite them as
h˜B
(
P−B − PDB
)−∆VˆBhVˆ = h˜B (P−B − PDB )+ (VˆB − gB)hVˆ = 0, and (B.16)
h˜A
(
P−A − PDA
)−∆VˆAhVˆ = h˜A (P−A − PDA )+ (VˆA − gA)hVˆ = 0. (B.17)
to show, that the semi-replication in [Burgard and Kjaer 2013] simply generates a shift of  with
respect to the full replication hedge ratio for the counterparty A
Vˆ − gA = −
(
P−A − PD
)−  = Full Replication Weight− . (B.18)
To summarize:
• the  shift off of the full replication ratio for the counterparty A does not come from any
no-arbitrage constraints,
• it is simply (voluntary) under-hedging and not a semi-replication.
Furthermore, there is no reason for the specific choice of the bonds in [Burgard and Kjaer 2013].
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B.2 Semi-replication - Choice of Replicating Bonds
There is no reason for the specific choices of the bonds and their recoveries in [Burgard and Kjaer 2013],
the full replication is achievable with any portfolio of counterparty A bonds.
To see this we will approach it from a more general setting. Assume the counterparty A above has
issued n bonds P−A,i with different seniorities - different recovery rates RA,i. One can write for these
bonds
dGA,i = dP
−
A,i + rA,iP
−
A,idt = −(1−RA,i)P−A,idJA + rA,iP−A,idt. (B.19)
This transforms the last term of Eqn.3.7 into[
hVˆ ∆VˆA −
n∑
i=1
hA,i(1−RA,i)P−A,i
]
dJA =
[
hVˆ ∆VˆA +
(
PDA − P−A
)]
dJA. (B.20)
Here the notations are generalization of the ones used in [Burgard and Kjaer 2013]
−
n∑
i=1
hA,iP
−
A,i +
n∑
i=1
hA,iRA,iP
−
A,i = P
D
A − P−A . (B.21)
Setting also hVˆ = 1 and ∆VˆA = gA − Vˆ as in [Burgard and Kjaer 2013] one can write[
∆VˆA +
(
PDA − P−A
)]
dJA =
[
gA − Vˆ + PDA − P−A
]
dJA. (B.22)
It is easy to see that weights hA,i exist such that the expression in square brackets of Eqn.B.22 can
be set to zero
gA − Vˆ + PDA − P−A = 0, or Vˆ − gA = −
(
PDA − P−A
)
, (B.23)
i.e. the loss in value of the derivative due to the default by counterparty A is restored by the
recovery from a short position in the portfolio of bonds issued by the counterparty A.
Notice, that it is not the individual weights in the portfolio of bonds (consequently, not the seniority
or other characteristics of each of the issue) that matter, but rather the total amount of the debt
holdings
−
n∑
i=1
hA,iP
−
A,i +
n∑
i=1
hA,iRA,iP
−
A,i = −hA
n∑
i=1
vA,iP
−
A,i + hA
n∑
i=1
vA,iRA,iP
−
A,i
= hA
(
PDA − P−A
)
. (B.24)
Here hA =
∑n
i=1 hA,i and vA,i =
hA,i
hA
.
